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1. Introduction 
In this paper we explore various factors that influence the relative growth 
or decline of industries under alternative industrial organizations. Underlying 
the study is the vi$w that an important ingredient in the performance of an 
industry over time is the extent to which the opportunities for cost reduction 
and product improvement made possible by the supply of new inventions are 
exploited. We focus attention on this by supposing that the flow of new ideas 
and inventions pertinent to the industry in question is exogenously given; i.e. 
it is independent of the industry’s activities, but that the exploitation of such 
ideas and inventions @valves innovation, or det,elopmenr, costs. We are then 
required to analyze the factors that influence the frequency and magnitude of 
innovations in an industry, and thereby the performance of an industry. But 
the incentives that firms have for undertaking innovations depend on such 
ingredients as the growth in demand, the technology of innovations, and the 
legal structure (e.g. patent rights). In this paper, therefore, we attempt to 
analyze how these basic ingredients influence the structure and performance 
of an industry.over time. We do this in the context of a model of a single- 
product industry which can avail i&elf of a steady stream of inventions and 
undertake process innovation. Innovations, however, involve fixed costs and 
such costs influence the frequency with which process innovations are 
undertaken. The analytical device we rely heavily on to conduct the 
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investigation is the idea of a sre~d~ stctte, and for the most part (sections 2 
and 3) we study an industry in whtch there is a kind of ‘free-entry’ by firms 
willing to umovate. We postulate that the industry is in a steady state and 
suppose that firms are profit-maximtzing and that they behave in a Cournot 
manner. WI: then attempt both to check whether the steady state so 
posrulated is in fact sustained and also to draw out the characteristics of the 
s~dy state. For the competitive model with free entry it transpires that the 
analysis is unusually complicated. We therefore take recourse to certain 
approximations so as to obtain sharp results. The details of some of the 
arguments leading to the approximations are provided in the appendix. The 
body of the paper contains an account of the model and a discussion of the 
results. 
This paper is part of a sequence of theoreticst explorations that we have 
undertaken LO study the relationship between the structure of an industry 
(e.g. the number of firms in the industry, and the degree of concentration) 
Jnd the nature of innovative activity undertaken within the industry (e.g. the 
frequency of innovations).’ The starting presumption in our investigation has 
been to treat both industrial structure and technical change as endogenous 
to the model and to view the relationship between them as oligopolistic 
equilibrium condiiions. In our earlier work we analyzed these issues in the 
context of models postulating a single innovation. Here we study an industry 
in steady state, which sustains an indefinite sequence of innovations. For 
analytical tractability we postulate a limited form of free entry, one where 
any given firm is entitled to innovate and enter the industry only once (e.g. 
because of the threat of anti-trust suits).2 Innovation involves a fixed cost. 
The latest iirm to innovate enters with the best-practice technique. The 
exogenously given flow of new ideas and inventions is modelled by way of a 
fundamental innovation frontier which represents the trade-off between the 
percentage rate at which innovation costs increase and the percentage rate at 
which unit variable cost of production associated with the best-practice 
technique declines (see fig. 1). The hypothesis that the industry is in a steady 
state in fact implies that a unique point on this frontier characterizes the rate 
of technological progress; that is, the rate of reduction in unit variable cost 
for the industry. However, because innovations involve costs, they are not 
undertaken continuousiy, and in fact only a finite number of firms are 
actualiy engaged in production at any moment - those whose technologies 
are sufficiently modern that the marginal costs of production associated with 
these techniques are less than the market price. Indeed, the innovating firm 
exits on the date when, due to the postulate of a continual exogenous growth 
‘se Dasgupta and Stiditz !1977. 198% 198Ob), and Dasgupta,,Gilbert and Stiglitz (198Oa, 
198Ob) 
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in demand, the market price falls below the marginal cost of production it 
encounters. Along the steady state the departing tit-m is replaced by an 
innovating firm so thst the number of firms engaged in production remains 
constant. Entry drives the present-value of prolits earned by the innovating 
firm to zero in our approximation, and firms practice mark-up pricing to 
cover innovation costs. The model, we believe, captures a crucial aspect of 
the Schumpeterian view of competition, where firms are described as facing a 
‘perennial gale of creative destruction’. III equilibrium, therefore, the number 
of active firms is related to the degree of imperfection in competition, the 
distribution of profits, and in turn to the frequency of innovations, and 
therefore entry. This explains the title of the paper. 
By way of contrast with the oligopolistic industry that results from 
competition, we analyze the case of an industry controlled by a permanent 
private monopohst (i.e. protected by entry barriers) in section 5, and also the 
case of the socially managed industry in section 4. The hypothesis that the 
industry is in a steady state implies for the model that the rate of 
technological progress, and therefore the I&g-run average growth in industry 
output, is the same for the three industrial organizations under study. The 
industrial organizations differ, however, by way of the frequenq with which 
innooations are undertaken and also the magnitude of the innovations when 
they are utiertaken. The model highEights the choice an ‘industry’ has 
between undertaking minor innovations frequently and major innovations 
infrequently. The three industrial organizations we study in this paper resolve 
this choice problem in different manners. Among the conclusions we arrive at 
are (a) that a monopolist, protected fully by entry barriers, enpages in 
innovations less frequently than is socially optimal, but that when it does, it 
undertakes more dramatic innovations: and (b) that a competitive industry 
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engages in overly small innovations too frequently if the demand for its 
product is growing at a fast rate. 
2. lunwation under competition 
In what follows we assume away income effects. We are interested in 
analyzing steady states. In order to do this we must suppose the 
(compensated) market demand curve to be iso-elastic. This is admittedly a 
very special form. But it is the only form which will enable us to study 
stcsdy states, a central case. 
A driving force behind innovation is probably the growth in demand.3 We 
accommodate this by postulating a constant rate, rn, at which the demand 
curve shifts outwards. To be specific, writing by Q, total market output at t, 
the market clearing price, p(Q,), is assumed to be of the form 
p(Q,~=c~Q,~~e~‘, o,m,c>O, (1) 
where l/c is the elasticity of demand. 
It should be of no surprise that a dynamic market equilibrium is ditlicult 
to characterize in general. For this reason we focus attention on steady state 
equilibria. Along a steady state innovations occur at fixed intervals of length, 
‘I; and at all times there is a Rxed number of active firms in the industry. in 
what follows we shall suppose there to be a perfect capital market with the 
rate of interest r (>O). 
Consider an instant in time when a firm innovates and enters. Without 
loss of generality, let this instant be t=O. The innovating firm incurs 
innovation cost F, and enters with the best-practice technique at which the 
marginal cost of production is C,. There are n firms in existence and the 
previous innovation, by hypothesis, occurred at t = - T when the innovating 
tirm entered with production technique C_ I‘ and incurred innovation cost 
F_,. Suppose g is the rate of technical progress (i.e. the percentage rate of 
fall in unit operating cost). It is, like n and T, endogenous to the model. If at 
t -0 the entering firm innovates lvith the technique C,, then along the steady 
state, C._ T= C,eY’. Let h denote the percentage rate of increase in innovation 
costs. It too is endogenous to the model and it is linked to g via the 
innovation frontier which we shall define presently. But since F,, is the cost 
of innovation at t =0, the previous innovator, along the steady state, incurred 
F_T= F,emh’ as its innovation cost. 
There are n active firms. At t =0 - the date of the latest innovation - the 
ith youngest firm (with i=O, l,..., n - 1) in existence operates with technique 
‘The late Jacob Schmookler, in a series d writings, laid great emphasis on this. E.g. sex 
Schmookler (1962). 
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C,eiO“, having incurred the innovation cost Foe- ihl‘, at the date of entry t = 
- iT Along the steady state under study the next innovation OCCUIS at t = X 
the innovating firm entering with lechnique C,e-gT :md incurring innovation 
costs amounting to Foe hT At t = T the oldest firm (i = II- 1) will find it most .
profitable to exit, keeping the total number of firms in operation at n. Then. 
at any instant of time one will observe n firms in operation, each using a 
different technique of production, where these techniques can be ranked 
unambiguously in terms of their vintage. The firms, acting non-cooperatively, 
will of course, not be sharing the market equally, since their operating costs 
are different. Furthermore, each lirm is active for precisely nT years. Thus, in 
particular, the firm innovating at I=() will exit at date 117: For analytical 
simplicity we shall suppose that a firm can enter the industry at most once. 
Thus, the lirm innovating at t =0 will have reached its decision based on an 
expected survival period of nr 
This, in outline, is the characteristic of the industry we shall study. We 
now proceed to discuss the analytical details which ensure that such a steady 
state can arise as an intertemporal non-cooperative equilibrium. In what 
follows we suppose that firms entertaLl Cournot conjectures regarding others 
and choose their dates of entry, and the flow of their output during their 
lifetime, so as to maximize the present value of their net profits. it is in an 
innovating firm’s choice of the timing (and therefore, the magnitude) of the 
innovation that we are attempting to cr?ture the R&D problem and the 
forces that determine whether what is essentially a competitive industry is 
growing or declining relative to the rest of the economy. Thus, at any date t, 
let C, denote the best-practice technique available in principle; that is, the 
technique with the lowest operating cost known at t. The cost of innovation 
at t is F,. This is the fixed cost required to develop the existing best-practice 
technique. 
We now proceed to describe the innovation frontier. For simplicity of 
exposition assume for the moment that time is measured in discrete intervals, 
witb the length of an interval being denoted by 1). One can now imagine that 
from the point of view of the industry in question there is an exogenously 
*given flow of ideas and basic inventions which ensure that, for a given pair 
(C,,F,), there is a set, &C,, F,), of feasible pairs of operating and innovation 
costs from which choio: at t + CI can be made. 
Suppose that the efficient points in the set &C,, F,) are given by the locus 
Ft+o -F,)/F,=eG((C,-C,..,,)/OC,+,), 
where G is an increasing and strictly convex function, independent of time. 
and with the limiting properties G (0) -= 0 and G (x ) = ‘x. If we now move to 
continuous time by letting O-+0, the innovation frontier characterized by (2) 
reduces to the form 
(dF,!‘dr)lF, = G (9, ), (3) 
where 
g, E -- (dCJdt),‘C,. (4) 
As we are postulating a steady state, g, is independent of time and SO the 
innovation frontier reduces to the form 
(dF,ldr);‘F,=h=G(g). (5) 
The innovation frontier h=G(g) is drawn in fig. 1. We shall note below that 
if a steady state exists, the parameters characterizing the industry determine 
uniquely the point on the innovation frontier which sustains the steady state. 
That is to say, if a steady state exists it is sustained by a unique rate of 
technical progress, g, which is treated as a parameter by the firms in the 
industry. What is chosen by firms is the frequency, and therefore the 
magnitude of innovations; that is, the frequency and magnitude with which 
thrs flow of inventions characterizing the technical progress are exploited. 
We turn now to the output decision of an active firm. Assume that there 
are n active firms. at any date. Consider the ith youngest tirm along a steady 
state. There is no loss of generality if we merely compute its short-run profit 
maximizing output policy. Let Q’ denote its output at an arbitrary date and 
let Qi denote the output of the remaining firms in the industry (i.e. Qi 
=x;-+iQ’). If C” is the unit operating cost it faces, it must choose Q’ with a 
view to maximizing [p(Q’ + Qi)- C’]Q’, which, on using (1) yields as the first- 
order condition 
1 --d/Q= C’MQ), (6) 
where 
Suppose as before that at t =0 an innovation occurs, and let C, be the 
unit oFrating cost the innovating firm faces.’ Then we may sum (6) to 
‘We Iteed merely to study the lirst-order condition. The reader will be able to confirm 
subsequently that i? F, is small and if m is not too small an equilihrium exists, even when 
demand is inelastic (E> 1). In particular, we shall note that if Fn is small, then equilibrium n will 
be large, and in faa that n;s. inelasticity of demand can r&dily be accomm-dated into the 
theory of oligopoly with free entry. For details, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (198Oa). 
it. 
“The choice ol t =:O as an Innovating date is of course without signif!cance. Nothing hinges on 
obtain the condition 
II- I 
n --E=C~ C eigT/p. 
i=o 
(8) 
From (8) it follows that the price of the product remains constant during the 
interval between two adjacent innovations [i.e. for tc (0, T)]. But with 
market price constam, demand, and therefore sales, grows at the rate m/s 
[eq. (l)]. Now at t = T eq. (8) takes the form 
“-1 
n-E=COe-gT 1 e’g”/p. 
i--O 
(9) 
It follows from (9) that at the next innovation date, i.e. t= T, market price 
falls discontinuously by the factor e- gT But this means, by (1 ), that industry .
sales must increase discontinuously at t = T by the factor egT.‘. Since we are 
considering a steady state, these features are repeated at each innovation 
date iT (i=O, 1,2,.. .); see figs. 2 and 3. 
In order.to characterize the oligopoly equilibrium in some detail we need 
to make certain types of approximations. In what follows we shall suppose 
that the fixed cost of innovation, Fo, is small relative to industry sales at 
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limiting case F,=O. In this case the market is perfectly competitive, with 
p,=C, at all t and innovations occur continuously: that is. T=O. In this 
limiting case the number of firms, n, will be infinite. 
It follows that if F,, is ‘small’, then along a steady state !I is ‘large’ and T is 
‘small’. 4 firm in equilibrium will operate so long as its cost of production 
does not exceed the market price. Since we are supposing that F0 is ‘small 
we are entitled to approximati and suppose that the innovating firm at t=O 
will exit a: the date market price falls to its marginal cost of production, Co. 
But this date along the steady state is nT. Thus, if p,, is equilibrium product 
price at t = 0, we have also the condition 
Poe - g*T = co, (10) 
We shall note below that the steady state value of g is a finite positive 
number. Write tt=nT, a represertative firm’s lifetime. Then (10) says that as 
Fo+O, v-*0 (even though n-, LYJ). 
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Along the market equilibrium the frequency of innovations must be 
sufftciently fast that it does not pay firms to enter. Given our approximation 
we may suppose that the present-value of profits earned by an innovating 
firm is zero. We now proceed to construct the ‘zero-profit’ condition for the 
firm innovating at t =O. 
Now, at any date, the ith youngest firm’s flow of profit can be expressed as 
P(Q)Q'-C'Q'=p(Q)Q'-P(Q)C~-EQ'/QIQ'=P(Q)EQ'~/Q. (11) 
Therefore, if at t =0, the date of the innovation in question, aggregate output 
is Q. and market price is pO, then on using (6) in (11) we obtain that the 
profit flow at t =0 to the latest innovator is 
(12) 
During the interval (0, T) the market price remains constant (see fig. 2) but 
output grows at the rate m/r: (fig. 3). Therefore, the present discounted value 
of the flow of profits to the innovator during (0, T) is, by (12) 
Po(l -G/P,)2 dt=- ..___-.__.__ Qo(l _e--‘s~)r)_ 
c(r--m/E) 
(13) 
At t = T market price falls discontinuously by the factor e-‘r, leading to a 
discontinuous increase in aggregate sales by the factor errTic. Therefore, 
aggregate sales at T is 
, 
and price at is 
Using in (12) that the of profits t= T to 
the firm that innovates 
-( _C,/p,e-BT)LQ,e(“+B)Tic, 
E 
During the period price remains and aggregate increase 
at the rate Therefore, as in we may from 
vantage point t -0, present discounted value the flew profits 
during (7; 1T) to the firm innovating at t =O as 
and. in general, the present discounted r:alue of the flow of profits during the 
ith pried [i.e. during ((i- I )7: iT)] for uhe tirm innovating at t =0 is 
There are, in all, II periods to consider. Summing these n present-values we 
obtain the present discounted value of the flow of prolits to the firm 
inn’ovating at t=O. which on equating to F,, yields the zero-profit condition. 
Thus we have 
” -e~“-m’c’Tl”~’ d-i’Y+r)Tei(m+g)T/r{l _C,jpoe-igT)2 =F,IPoQo _ __ 
&(r-m/k) i=O 
(14) 
In fact one can simplify (14) on the supposition that F0 is ‘small’ so that T 
and c are ‘small’. In the appendix we shall confirm that for small T and o, 
eq. (14) reduces to 
it follows that in order to ensure the existence of a steady state market 
equilibrium we must suppose that @ii- g)/~>r - i.e. that innovation is 
suflicienily profitable.. We suppose this to be the casea Furthermore, since 
the date of innovatiptj, t =0, under study has been arbitrarily chosen, eq. (14) 
says that the ratio of inr ovation c M to market revenue is the same at all 
innovation dates. 
If we now appeal to iI) and (loi, eq. (15) reduces to 
(16) 
which is a useful form, because the RHS of (16) is composed solely of 
%bsequently we shall note parariietric conditions under which this hypothesis is justified. 
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exogenous parameters of the economy - including what might be called 
‘initial conditions’. 
We proceed now to simplify the equilibrium condition (8) by making use 
of (10) to express it as 




With our approximations (17) reduces to 
1: gv - 
T [--------I gT+(gT)2/2 T 1 +gT/2 ’ 
or 
and, therefore that 
gv2 c 287: (18) 
Finally, we analyse the determinants of the steady state rate of 
technological progress. Now we have noted that the ratio of mar!;et price to 
unit cost of production associated with the best-practice technique at each 
innovation date is the same. It follows from eq. (14) ,.hat the ratio of the cost 
of innovation to gross industrial revenue is also independent of the date of 
innovation. However, for the representative interval be!ween innovations. 
(0, T), we have pT=poe-@ and QT=QOe’m+9’T;i,. It follows then that for a 
steady state to be maintained 
h = (dF,/dr)/F, = -- g + (HI + g),‘r:, (19) 
which. on using eq. (5) means that the steady state rate of technical progress. 
g, must be the solution of the equation 
G(g)= -g+(m+g)/E. (20) 
The steady state rate of technical progress is determined by m. I: and the 
parameters underlying the innovation frontier G(. ). It is independent of 7; 
and quite naturally, of initial conditions F, and C,. (See fig. 1.) 
We may now summarize the steady state equilibrium for the industry in 
question. As usual, let us concentrate our attention on the arbitrary 
innovation date t=O. The variables to be determined within the model are 
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po, 11. I:. 7; g, io. Q6 [i=O , , . . ., (n - I)].’ They are obtained from equations I 
(1). i.7). (lo), (18). and (20). Aside E, m and the parameters 
the innovation frontier G(. ), F. are 
3. Charactcristirs of 
An important variant of in industrial organization 
be asked here. is the relationship between degree of 
and the frequency of To see this, recall that by 
eq. (18) reduces to the 
It tempting to use, the inverse of number of in the 
industry as an index of concentration. Eq. (21) says that oligopoly equilibria 
cue characterized by a negative association between this index of 
concentration and the frequency of innovutions. Thus, in a cross-section study 
of industries differing in their initial conditions, F, and Co, one will observe 
stich a negative association. But since n and T are both endogenous in the 
model such a relationship must not be given any causal interpretation: 
industrial concentration and the frequency of innovations are simultaneously 
determined in the model. 
Typically though, the inverse of the number of firms in an industry has not 
been used as an index of concentration. Perhaps the most popular summary 
measure is the concentration ratio. For our model we may as well regard the 
concentration ratio as the ratio of sales of the most recent innovator to 
aggregate industry sales. From (6) and (10) note that 
Q"/Q = ggit;, (22) 
which, on using eq. (16), yields 
Q"/Q 2: (2gT/e)i. (23) 
El. (23) SUJX that in’ u cross-section study of industries dtjking by their 
initinl conditions F,, Co, there will be a negative association between the 
concentration ratio and the frrequrncy of innovations. But again, this 
rekionship must not be given any causd interpretation.8 
‘n is obtained from the identity vznT. 
‘These foregoing two results can be summarizvd try saying that so long as the degree of 
concentration is not too large, a higher level oI induhtrial concentration is associated with less 
frequent innovations. But the magnitude of the innovations (i.e. cost reduction) at each date of 
innovation will be higher for the more concentrated industry. 
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We are particularly interested in the rate of technological progress g, and 
hence the growth in industrial output. For, at each innovation date industrial 
output increases by a factor e pT’C. The long-run average rate of growth of 
output is therefore (m+g)/e. We turn now to eq. (20), which determines the 
steady state value of g. To obtain sharp answers suppose that the 
technological innovation frontier G(g) is of the form 
where H(g) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, with idiO)=O and H(z) 
= x. Notice now from (24) and (20) that the condition (m-tg)/c> I which, 
under our approximations, we have noted is necessary for the existence of a 
steady state equilibrium, is most certainly satisfied if m is not too small. Thus 
suppose that m is large enough to ensure that (m+ g) > rz. Let g, be the 
(unique) solution of eq. (2O), and let g denote the economy-wide average rate 
of growth of output.’ We may now dissect the determinants of industry 
growth in equilibrium and in turn identify parameters that determine the 
industry’s performance relative to that of the rest of the economy. An 
industry which keeps par with the rest of the economy is one for which (m 
+g,)/z=g, for in this case the long-run average growth in industry output is 
the same as the rest of the economy, In the obvious manner one may define 
a ‘declining’ or ‘growing’ industry - relative to the rest of the economy. 
Notice now that iig,/Zm>O. ?gCjiccO and ig,/?j3>0. Therefore, industries 
facing a higher exogenous growth rate in the df*ivand for their product 
experience a faster long-run rate qf w~*hnicul progress and in turn a higher 
long-run rate of growth in oufput.‘” !.?CGC interestingly. perhaps, industries 
facing a more elastic demund for their products experience a jirslrr long-ruin 
rute of technical progress and also a higher long-run rate of growth in ourpur 
[since I!?(@I+~,)/E)/?E<~]. The model implies that if two indus!ries are to 
remain on par with each other in terms of long-run growth performance, 
then cet. par. the exogenous growth in the demand for the product of the 
industry facing the more inelastic demand must he greater. Finally, industries 
that are better endowed for rechnological progress (lower caltte of p) enjoy a 
higher long-run rate qf growth in output. 
We may in fact solve the equilibrium conditions explicitly. Thus. on using 
eq. (18) in eq. (16) we obtain the equilibrium period between innovations. 
T,, as 
‘In what follows the subscripT c below a variable denotes the value of the variable under 
comptitive equilibrium. The reader may confirm that if f, IS sufficiently small and On + g,) > rh 
then a steady state equilibrium exists and is in fact the state we are analysing here. 
“Sex Schmookler (1%2). 
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which. on using in (18) yields the equilibrium life of a firm, u,, as 
Using eq. (26) in (IX) we may obtain the equilibrium number of firms, n,, as 
Finally. an appeal to eq. (22) yields the concentration ratio as 
(27) 
lr jbllo~s immcditrtel~ thcrt un increase in (initial) innocution C’OSS, Fo, reduces 
the jiieyuency rvirh \&ich innovations are undertctken, reduces the equilibrium 
number of firms und ut the some time increases the life spun of the 
represent&ve firm. It crlso results in an increase in the concentration ratio. 
These co,nclusions are intuitively reasonable; for innovation costs are a cost 
of entry, and these results make clear that to the extent innovation costs can 
bc affected by govcmment policy (e.g. by development subsidies), industrial 
structure can be affected in ways that one might expect. 
Now quite clearly government policy can directly influence C,, e.g. by a 
constant rate of ad-valorum tax or subsidy on each unit produced. Eqs. (25)- 
(3) make the :;omewhat surprising points that if EC 1 a reduction in unit 
operating cost, C,, increases the jrequency of innovations, reduces the life of 
the represent&l-e j&-m, increases the number of firms in the industry und 
decreases the concentration ratio. Just the reverse is the case if demand is 
ineiustic; i.e. E> 1, as eqs. (25 )-(28) make clear. It is curious that the effect of 
a change ir. the unit cost of production on the characteristics of an oligopoly 
equilibritim depends so critically on the elasticity of demand. 
The elect of an increase in the exogenous growth rate in demand, m, is 
somewhat predictable. Industries experiencing a greater growth in the market 
for their products undertake innooutions more frequently and the lifespan of 
the representatirejirm in such industries is shorrer. !30 too are the effects of 
the interest rate on industrial structure in line with what one might expect. 
An increase in the interest rate, r, reduces the frequency of innovations, 
increcises the hfespan oj‘ the representative firm, reduces the equilibrium 
number of firms in the industry and causes an increase in the concentration 
rario. Finally, un increase in the size of the market, 0, increases the frequency 
of innL:ations, reduces the &span of the representative firm, increases the 
equilibrium number of firms in the industry, and causes a decline in the 
concentration ratio. 
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4. The socially managd industry 
We turn now to an analysis of the socially managed industry. To keep 
matters tractable we suppose that the planner chooses among steady states. 
It is clear that the planner will use only the existing best-practice technique: 
i.e. only the latest vintage will be in operation at any time. We suppose as 
well that the government can finance its expenditures from general taxation. 
Hence social welfare maximization dictates the marginal-cost pricing rule. 
Thus p, = C, for all t, which, on using (1). implies that 
Q, = [O/Ct]l@e(mia)r. (29) 
We ?rlay now note that the hypothesis that the socially managed industry 
is also in a steady state implies that the rate of technical progress. g,, for this 
industry is, like the competitive one, the solution of eq. (20). Thus g,=g,. 
This follows from the fact that along a steady state the ratio of innovation 
costs to gross revenue must be independent of the date of innovation. It 
follows that the long-run average growth rate in output in the socially 
managed industry is the same as that in the competitive one. Let T denote 
the interval between innovations. Then we may note from (29). !hat in the 
intervals between innovations output grows at the rate m/c and that at each 
innovation date outptt increases discontinuously by the factor &‘, ‘I?‘. We are 
however interested in the optimum steady state; that is, the optimum value 
of 1: Let us suppose that the competitive interest rate, r, is regarded as 
appropriate for discounting social benefits. 
Now, the social utility function associated with the (compensated) demand 
curve (1) is 
u(Q,)=[a(‘(l -E)]Q’~-@~~‘. I (30) 
Thus suppose without IOSE of generality that t=O is an innovation date. 
Then if F, is the innovation cost and if C, is unit operating cost associated 
with the best-practice technique at t =0, then during the interval (0, T) the 
planner will set p,=C,, and so the flow of net social benefits, excluding 
innovation costs, during (0, T) will be 
u(Q,)-C,Q,=[E/(I -c)]&T;( -c)ire’mir)t, (31) 
and, more generaiiy, the flow of net social benefits, excluding innovation 
costs, during the interval (i7;(i+ 1)T); will be 
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It follows that the present discounted value of net social benefits, excluding 
innovation costs. is 
rs.(* _E)lbl/rc;(l-6)ic l -e-‘r-m’r’Tsw” uo c L tr-m/e) 1 a,, tg, -~m+e*V&)T ,ge-.- I (33) 
and we assume that r + g, > (m + g,)/c.l t 
We turn now to the present value of innovation costs. Along a steady state 
innovation costs increase at the percentage rate h= -g,+ (m+g,)h. 
Therefore. the present value of the flow of innovation expenditure is 




r - nl Jo = a. r+g,-(m+g,)/c=b, 
[&/[] -E)]&y;(1-WEsJ. (35) 
Combining (33) and (34) we may now express the present value of the flow 
of net social benetits (inclusive of innovation costs) as 
I :(I -e-aT)_F, (1 _emPT)-l. 1 (34) 
The social planner’s problem consists in choosing T with a view to 





; (1 -emaT)-F,, [l -e-br]-lX(). 
I 
(37) 
To simplify suppose again that F, is small, so that the optimal value of ‘T; call 




“Thu%. when wc come IO comparing the competitive industry with the socially managed one 
we must suppose hoth m+g,>n: and r,r+g,)s>m+g,; i.e. that m+gcrrc>m+gs-egs (with 
g-=g,!. 
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We conclude immediately thut the optimal frequency of innovations is greater 
in industries facing a larger growth in demand, (m); is (I decreasing function of 
rhe initial cost of innovation, is an increasing function of the size of the 
market, u, and is a decreasing or increasing function of the initial operuting 
cost depending On whether or not rhe market demand curve is elastic. Most 
remarkable, perhaps, eq. (39) tells us that to a first ‘approximation the 
optimum frequency of innovations is independent ?f the social rate of discount. 
The question arises how the competitive frequency of innovation compares 
with the socially optimal frequency. 17, see this one must compare eqs. (25) 
and (39) to establish that T, $ T, as 2s((m + g,)/s) - r) 2 g,, where g, ( = g,) is the 
(unique) solution of eq. (20). 
In particular, this result tells us that competition encourages innovations Co 
be undertaken too frequently if the exogenous rate of growth in demand, m, is 
large.” Thus, a competitive industry facing a large growth in demand will be 
characterized by ‘small’ innovations occurring too frequently. 
5. Pure monopoiy 
The case of the pure monopolist, protected fully by entry barriers, paralMs 
the analysis presented in the previous section. But we must now restrict 
ourselves to the case O<E< 1. We may therefore merely present the results 
without supplying details. In what follows we suppose that the monopolist 
faces a perfect capital market, where the interest rate is r. The monopolist, 
we assume, wishes to maximize the present value of net profits, and that his 
choice is restricted to one among steady states. This latter assumption 
implies as before that the rate of technical progress, call it g,, that the 
monopolist faces is the solution of eq. (20). Thus gc = g, = g,. Without loss of 
generality let us suppose that the monopolist innovates at t =O. Then it 
follows from (1) that the monopolist’s output, Qo. at this date is 
Q,,=[u(~-E)/C,,-J~‘~. (4) 
Write 
I r-m/e=a, r+g,-(m+g,,,)/r:=b, 
(1 -&)l’&[&/(l -&)]bl’LC;‘l _C)‘EEB. (41) 
Suppose T is the interval between innovations. Then an argument identical 
to the one leading to (36) establishes the the monopohst will wish to choose 
T with a view to maximizing the expression 
[ 
~(I-esaT)-F, [l-e-bT]-l. 1 
%I particular. if m z-m. 
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As before, we approximate and suppose that F0 is ‘small’. Let T, denote the 
monopolist’s profit maximizing choice of the interval between innovations. 
Then, an argument parallel to the one leading to eq. (39) establishes that 
(43) 
u‘~e NOW compare eqs. (39) and (43) we conclude that a monopolist, protected 
fully by entry harriers, undertakes innorations less frequently than is socially 
optimal. However, the monopolist’s innovations are always bigger than the 
soc+~lly optimal ones (this follows from the fact that g,==g,,,). 
6. Commentary and extension 
Our principal aim in this paper has been to construct a mode of analysis 
for locating the determinants of the long-run growth in output of an 
industry, and thereby to seek an explanation of the performance of an 
industry relative to that of others. Towards this end we have supposed that 
the spurt to an industry’s growth has as its source an exogenous increase in 
the demand for its product, and a steady supply of basic ideas and 
inventions thdt can be exploited - at a cost, of course - for the purposes of 
process innovation. Our interest in the long-run” performance of an industry 
suggests that the analysis be restricted to that of steady states. Equally 
important, the theoreticai construct of a steady state makes the model 
tractable. Since innovations involve fixed costs we know in advance that they 
will not occur continuously - nor is it desirable that they do so. So the 
important question arises as to the frequency with which innovations occur 
under alternative industrial organizations and also the magnitude of the 
innovations when they do occur. It is important to recognize that industrial 
organizations may differ with respect to the frequency and magnitude of 
innovations undertaken within them even while they are identical with 
respect to the long-run growth in output that they sustain. The model we 
have analyzed in this paper demonstrates this sharply, for we showed that 
the model implies that the long-run growth in output along a steady state is 
independent of industrial organization, 
Much of th,e analysis of this paper has been directed at a competitive 
industry (i.e. one characterized by free entry and non-cooperative behaviour). 
It is the opportunity of earning profits which ensures that innovations occur 
at steady intervals, but competition drives the profits obtained by the 
innovating firms to zero. Since innovations involve fixed costs, competition 
among firms results in an oligopolistic structure where, at any instant, only a 
finite number of firms are actua!ly engaged in production. Entry by a firm 
that has innovated results in a fall in product price - and hence an increase 
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in industry output - which in turn results in the economic obsolescence of 
the most ageing machines. For our model, this means the exit of the oldest 
firm in operation. A major weakness of the competitive model, of sections 2 
and 3, as we see it, is the hypothesis that a given firm is entitled to innovate 
at most once. This can be justified by postulating the presence of strong anti- 
trust legislation which deters existing firms from undertaking entry-deterring 
innovations. Removing this assumption greatly complicates the analysis. 
The advantages afforded by our insistence that the industry under study is 
in a steady state are obvious. Equally so, perhaps, are the disadvantages. We 
do not wish to make the vulgar complaint that steady-states are only a myth, 
but rather that the assumption really bolts down the rate of technical change 
for the industry and therefore the long-run growth in output - as eq. (20) 
makes clear. Obviously, one would like to make the rate of technical change, 
g, a choice variable, and the steady state hypothesis prevents us from doing 
that, unless the initial conditions, F, and Cc, have, by fluke, exactly the 
‘appropriate’ values. To see this let us return to the innovation frontier given 
by eq. (2). Assume that the economy is in a steady state. Let us suppose that 
at t a firm contemplates on entering the industry at t+O, and suppose we ’ 
allow the firm to choose a pair (C, +,,, FI+o) from the feasible set &C,,F,). 
Then clearly it would wish to choose with a view to minimizing the 
discounted value of its total costs. Now let Z,+,(r,g, m, ‘I: n) denote the sum. 
computed at t-k@, of the discounted values of the Row of output of the 
innovating firm during its lifetime, (t + 0, r + T+ 0). Then the firm wishing to 
innovate at t + 0 must choose C, +s so as to minimize C,+BZ,+B+F,+O, which 
on using eq. (2) becomes 
C,+,Z,+,+F,CI+G((C,-C,+,):IlC,+,)O)I. 
The first-order condition associated with (44) is 
Z ,+e--C,F,G’(. WCf+,,=O, 
which, on moving to continuous time by letting 040 reduces to the 
condition 
Z,Ct/F, = G’(g). 
Now return to the case of a firm innovating at t =O. Routine calculations 
show that along a steady state 
(46) 
where Qg is the output of the innovating firm at t=O. But for small F,,, and 
therefore small T, (46) reduces to 
which, on using in eq. (45) at t=O, means :hat 
C,Q:a/F, z G’(g). (47) 
But along a steady state, eq. (20) must also hold, and v and Q8 must satisfy 
eqs. (26) and (28). The system is therefore overdeterminate, unless F, and C,, 
by fluke, have precisely those values which ensure that the value of g which 
solves eq. (47) also satisfies eq. (20). However, it should be noted that if the 
forces of competition, in which the rate of technical progress is subject to 
choice, drives the industry in the long run to a steady state - and we can 
present no theory which says it does - then it must be the case that the cost 
structure (i.e. F, and C,) must tend in the long run to that locus which makes 
eqs. (20) and (47) consistent. 
We shall not attempt to summarize each of the results in t’his paper, but 
rather shall emphasize the fact that the model analyzed here suggests that if 
the growth in demand for the product of an industry is high the forces of 
competition result in too frequent a set of innovations, none of which on its 
own is sufficiently large; and that there are reasons for believing that a 
monopolist, protected fully by entry barrie+rs, undertakes innovations less 
frequently than is socially desirable, but that when it does, it undertakes 
unduly large innovations. It is not clear what in?uition one should have had 
about the nature of these biases. 
Appendix 
Here we want to show that for ‘small’ values of T and v, the zero-profit 
condition (14) reduces to eq. (15) in the text. Now, it will be noted that eq. 
I 14) can be expressed as 
~oQoC1 -e- (r--lll/t)r] 1 _e-n[r+g-(m+g)/GT - _. 
(r--/E) [ 1 __e-Ir+g-(m+g)lelT 
+$i(l -e- nlr-#-(m+#MlT) 2CO(l _e-alr-fm+g),k]T) 
Pi (1 _e-tr-e-~m+~W)T1 - ~oJi-~e_"-(mjiijF- ) 1 
=F 0' (A.11 
Now use eqs. (1) and (10) in the text in (A.1) to obtain 
P. Dasgupla and J. SQlirz, Em): innovution, exll 157 












=FoC’d -c)/rpw -w* 
-- 






Now, if K is a constant, then for smaiJ v and T (with r,JT large) we have 
+l -uK/2)(1 +TK,2,+1-UK/~). 
(A.3) 
If we now use (A.3) in the terms within the r,quare brackets of (A.21 WC have 
r’ 
-2e-g’)-~- - (K2 t-K3e 
2T 




~g2;(1_g.,~)2_.!:. 2T( -2gr~KJ+2gvK,+(2K,--K,)g’c’) 
b4.4) 
On using (A.4) and (A.2) one obtains eq (i 5) in the text. 
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